

# Assessing the Impact of Financial Capabilities Services for Newly Arrived Humanitarian Migrants

**Prepared for**  
International Rescue Committee

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# Foreword

This report was written for the International Rescue Committee (IRC) by students at the La Follette School of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. The learning objective of the La Follette School is to provide graduate students the opportunity to improve their policy analysis skills while providing the client an analysis of a policy problem on which a decision or set of decisions needs to be made.

The La Follette School offers a two-year graduate program leading to a Master in Public Affairs (MPA) or a Master in International Public Affairs (MIPA) degree. Students study policy analysis and public management, and they spend the first year and a half of the program taking courses in which they develop the expertise needed to analyze public policies, including skills in statistics, economics, and policy analysis. The authors of this report are all in the final semester of their degree program and are enrolled in the Workshop in Public Affairs. Although acquiring a set of policy analysis skills is important, there is no substitute for doing policy analysis as a means of experiential learning. The Workshop in Public Affairs gives graduate students that capstone opportunity as they produce a report for a real-world client about a question of importance to the organization.

I am grateful to the IRC for partnering with the La Follette School on this project. IRC staff members have been generous with their time to support the students' work. The students have collectively contributed hundreds of hours to the project and, in the process, developed critical insight. The La Follette School is grateful for this collaborative effort and hopes the report proves valuable.

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The views, opinions, and recommendations in this report represent those of the authors alone and do not reflect the findings, recommendations, or policies of the University of Wisconsin–Madison, the La Follette School, or the International Rescue Committee.

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## Abbreviations

CDFI	Community Development Financial Institution
CEO	Center for Economic Opportunity
FCS	Financial Capability Scale
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ORR	Office of Refugee Resettlement
SIV	Special Immigrant Visa

## Executive Summary

This report, prepared by the La Follette School of Public Affairs for the International Rescue Committee (IRC), evaluates the effectiveness of financial capability services in aiding the economic integration of humanitarian migrants in the United States. Humanitarian migrants — an all-encompassing term used to describe refugees, asylees, Special Immigrant Visa holders, and other vulnerable groups — often confront substantial obstacles in achieving financial stability upon their resettlement. Their challenges include navigating a complex financial system, overcoming language barriers, and building a new life with limited financial resources. The IRC’s financial capability programming aims to empower these individuals by offering them comprehensive financial education, personalized financial coaching, and access to tailored financial products. By providing such a holistic approach to financial capability programming, the IRC endeavors to foster long-term stability and integration, enabling humanitarian migrants to contribute positively to their new communities and the broader economy. This evaluation’s significance lies in its potential to inform policy decisions and program designs that directly impact the well-being and integration outcomes of humanitarian migrants. Through detailed analysis of program data and outcomes, this report aims to shed light on the critical role that financial capability programming plays in the resettlement process and recommend strategies for enhancing its effectiveness and reach.


This report navigates through four critical areas:

- (1) The IRC’s financial capability programming has been instrumental in improving financial literacy and outcomes for humanitarian migrants. The program’s impact is evident in the clients’ enhanced ability to navigate the United States financial system, resulting in better credit scores and savings behavior.
- (2) The IRC’s financial capability programming is essential to assist humanitarian migrants with the financial challenges they face upon arrival to the United States. Due to the nature of forced migration, humanitarian migrants leave behind assets and sources of income, resulting in financial vulnerability upon arrival. Their professional qualifications are often not recognized, which limits their job prospects and restricts their access to stable, well-paying employment, significantly hindering their ability to rebuild financial stability in the United States. Other obstacles such as language barriers, cultural differences, low digital literacy levels, and a lack of familiarity with complex financial systems also make it difficult for humanitarian migrants to integrate into the United States financially. This report examines these challenges and highlights the essential need for a combined approach of targeted financial education and personalized financial coaching to support humanitarian migrants in successfully integrating into the financial system.
- (3) Through rigorous program engagement analysis, the IRC’s initiatives positively correlate with a higher likelihood of gaining a credit score improving humanitarian migrants’ access to U.S. financial systems. Figure 1 represents these findings, underscoring the positive influence of different facets of the IRC’s programs on credit score improvement, while showing no relationship between attendance and financial behavior changes and budget management. This evidence bolsters the recommendation for further enhancement of program design and delivery, ensuring that these initiatives are fine-tuned to maximize effectiveness and extend their reach across diverse migrant populations. The data further indicates that improvements in program design and delivery remain essential to enhance their effectiveness and reach.



- (4) The success of the IRC’s financial capability programming is likely limited due to the program’s funding structure. The IRC currently receives funds for financial capability programming from various sources, none of which are permanent. This means the longevity of the IRC’s financial capability programming depends on other entities’ willingness to provide funding, a situation that is not sustainable for a project of this scale. Recognizing this, we argue that integrating financial capability services into consistent federal integration funds, specifically those administered by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), would help ensure long-term sustainability and effectiveness.

**Figure 1: Attendance and Financial Outcomes**



Source: IRC Financial Capability Report Data 2022–2024.

Note: OLS regression estimates from Appendix B and C.

This report offers recommendations focusing on two main areas:

- (1) **Recommendation for public policy.** Recognizing the integral role of financial capability in successfully resetting humanitarian migrants, federal funding from the ORR should be specifically allocated through formula grants to support financial capability programming. This targeted funding should facilitate the provision of financial education, coaching, and access to financial products, equipping clients with vital skills for economic independence. Investment in financial literacy is not merely a facilitative measure but a crucial foundation for humanitarian migrants’ integration into society.
- (2) **Recommendation for the IRC.** The IRC should continue to invest in data collection procedures and prioritize developing and maintaining robust data collection strategies. This recommendation underscores the importance of methodical data gathering to ensure that evidence drives programmatic decisions and policy recommendations. A refined approach to data analytics can yield insights into program effectiveness, leading to adaptive strategies that better align with the needs of humanitarian migrants. The IRC must also proactively identify and mitigate factors leading to early program disengagement, devising strategies that foster consistent client participation — a vital determinant of the program’s success.

# Introduction

Immigrants make up more than 13% of the population in the United States (Noe-Bustamante 2020). Hailing from many areas worldwide, these individuals come to the U.S. for various reasons — to join their family members, receive a better education, and pursue a better life. Some of these individuals, such as refugees and asylum seekers, are motivated to come to the U.S. because they have faced prosecution, war, and violence in their home countries. Others are motivated due to economic hardships such as extreme poverty, deprivation, and dislocation brought on by famines or natural disasters. Together, all these individuals are referred to as humanitarian migrants,<sup>1</sup> an all-encompassing term used by humanitarian development organizations to describe all those who emigrate to the U.S. under circumstances that may evoke a humanitarian response (Seghetti, Ester, and Wasem 2015).

**Table 1: Breakdown of the Most Prevalent Humanitarian Migrants Categories**

Immigration Status	Legal Definition	Authority
<b>Refugee</b>	Status describes people who: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Are located outside of the U.S.;</li> <li>• Are of special humanitarian concern to the U.S.;</li> <li>• Demonstrate that they were persecuted or fear persecution due to race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group;</li> <li>• Are not firmly resettled in another country; and</li> <li>• Are admissible to the U.S.</li> </ul>	INA §101(a)(42)
<b>Asylee</b>	Status describes people who: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meet the definition of refugee;</li> <li>• Are already in the U.S.; and</li> <li>• Are seeking admission at a port of entry.</li> </ul>	INA §101(a)(42)
<b>Special Immigrant Visa for Iraqis and Afghans</b>	Status describes people who: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Worked as translators or interpreters or were employed by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government in Iraq or by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government or by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.</li> </ul>	P.L. 109-163 (first legislative provision)
<b>Parolee</b>	Status describes people who: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May otherwise be inadmissible or have no means to immigrate or enter the U.S. legally.</li> <li>• Parole power in INA authorizes the Attorney General, at his or her discretion, to “parole” any noncitizen into the U.S. “temporarily under such conditions as [she or] he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”</li> </ul>	INA § 212(d)(5)(A)

Note: This table does not include all categories of humanitarian migrants; rather, this is a representative list of immigration categories that are most prevalent for the purposes of this report.

No matter their official immigration status in the U.S., all humanitarian migrants face a similar challenge as they resettle and integrate into a new society: achieving financial stability. Due to extenuating circumstances in their home country, most humanitarian migrants are forced to flee, arriving in the U.S. with little to no resources. However, there is a critical need for access to financial resources to ensure stability during the integration process (Halpern 2008). Although eligible humanitarian migrants receive very modest support to supply basic household furnishings and cover the cost of essential needs in the first months after arrival, their families face immediate pressure to take steps toward earning income and gaining economic independence.

<sup>1</sup> “Humanitarian Migrant” is not defined in The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the official act that governs immigration to and citizenship in the U.S. Rather, the term is used to describe the factors underlying the alien’s justification for immigration — political or economic reasons.

For instance, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), a program of the Administration for Children and Families within the United States Department of Health and Human Services, provides time-limited cash and medical assistance to humanitarian migrants that fall within their category of ORR-Eligible Populations.<sup>2</sup> The ORR also provides support for case management services, English as a Second Language classes, and job readiness and employment services through the Refugee Resettlement Program (RRP) services — all designed to facilitate the new arrivals’ successful transition to life in the U.S. and help them to attain social and economic independence (Administration for Children and Families 2024). However, the cash and medical assistance typically do not suffice to cover family needs and are only available for twelve months upon arrival. The other ORR programs, partnerships, and services, though longer lasting, do not specifically provide funding for financial integration (Administration for Children and Families, 2023). This leaves humanitarian migrants in a difficult position to financially integrate into the U.S. because factors like the lack of familiarity with the U.S. financial system, language skills, and cultural differences serve as barriers to full financial integration. To address this need, other organizations have stepped in to fill in the gap, including, prominently, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) (IRC 2017).

As the nation’s second-largest and longest-serving resettlement agency, the IRC’s work with humanitarian migrants is expansive. Through a network of 30 field offices spread across the U.S. each year, the IRC resettles some 15% of all new individuals and provides services to thousands of additional individuals through longer-term programming designed to support successful integration and the development of thriving families (IRC 2017). In particular, the IRC places great importance on the economic empowerment of newly arrived humanitarian migrants. To cater to the unique financial situations of these individuals, the IRC offers three essential financial capability programs: (1) classroom-based financial education and skill development, (2) one-on-one financial coaching and counseling, and (3) access to customized financial products (IRC 2017). Through the IRC’s financial capability programs, thousands of humanitarian migrants have obtained tools and accessed resources to successfully navigate the financial system in the U.S. (IRC 2023). The IRC aims to continue and expand its financial capability programs; however, to do so, the IRC needs additional funding.

This report aims to use existing literature to assess and support IRC data on the effectiveness of linguistically and culturally accessible financial education, financial coaching, and access to financial products in improving the early financial lives of humanitarian migrants. Evidence in this report supports the argument that federal entities, like the ORR, should designate specific funds for resettlement support services for financial capability programming.

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<sup>2</sup> “ORR-Eligible Populations” is an encompassing term referring to the population of newcomers that the ORR provides a broad range of support. ORR-Eligible Populations includes refugees, asylees, certain Cuban and Haitian entrants and Parolees, Certain Amerasians (from Vietnam), Victims of Human Trafficking, Special Immigrant Visa Holders from Iraq and Afghanistan, Afghan Special Immigrant Parole SI/SQ Parolees, Afghan individuals with Special Immigrant Conditional Permanent Residence, Afghan Humanitarian Parolees, Ukrainian Humanitarian Parolees, and other Non-Ukrainian individuals displaced from Ukraine (ORR 2024).

# Background

## International Rescue Committee

*“I want to say to other immigrant women ... not to be afraid. Even if sometimes feels scary, you should always keep going.” — Alona*

Alona had been living in Kyiv, the capital city of Ukraine, for over a decade until 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, and she was forced to leave everything behind and seek refuge in a safe place. In December of the same year, Alona arrived in America hoping for a better future. She was determined to learn how to navigate the U.S. financial system, and she connected with the IRC financial capability programming office in Phoenix and was assigned a financial coach who helped her formulate a plan to achieve her ultimate goal of opening a therapy practice to serve others dealing with difficult and traumatic situations. With encouragement and support from her coach, Alona worked on budgeting and credit-building skills, enrolled in courses needed to receive a therapy license, and considered working for a local therapist to gain more experience. Additionally, Alona’s coach helped her enroll in IRC Phoenix’s Small Business Development program, which provided support and guidance for opening her own business. Today, as Alona stands on the cusp of entrepreneurial success, she encourages other immigrant women to follow their dreams, even if it feels scary, and to always believe in themselves. Alona’s story is a testament to the life-changing impact of the IRC’s financial capability programming. Her journey mirrors the IRC’s unwavering commitment to fostering economic stability and success for humanitarian migrants.

The IRC plays a crucial role in supporting the integration of humanitarian migrants in the U.S. Its programs encompass various areas such as workforce development, asset augmentation, educational support, services for children and youth, food access and agriculture, health and wellness programming, small business programs, and immigration legal assistance. These comprehensive initiatives contribute significantly to fostering sustained success and upward mobility for humanitarian migrants within their new communities (IRC 2017). A crucial aspect of the IRC’s work is the financial empowerment of newly arrived humanitarian migrants because one of the biggest challenges that humanitarian migrants face once they arrive in their host country is navigating the new financial landscape. To address this challenge, the IRC has developed financial capability programming offering three fundamental financial empowerment services: (1) classroom-based financial education and skill-building, (2) individual financial coaching and counseling, and (3) access to tailored financial products (IRC 2017; IRC 2023).

### **IRC Financial Capability Programming**

The IRC’s financial capability programming provides various strategies aimed at empowering individuals to navigate financial challenges and achieve economic stability (IRC 2017). These initiatives include:

***Classroom sessions.*** Classroom sessions serve as foundational financial education workshops where humanitarian migrants learn how to navigate their new financial landscape. The IRC’s classroom sessions cover budgeting, saving, banking, credit management, and tax preparation, addressing critical topics often overlooked in standard financial education. Instructors also delve into banking safety and government support, fostering trust in financial institutions. These sessions aim to enhance clients’ financial literacy while serving as a foundation for measuring financial capability outcomes. To evaluate the effectiveness of these workshops, the IRC uses the Financial Capability Scale (FCS), a tool that provides a comprehensive assessment of clients’ financial knowledge, skills, and behaviors. By utilizing the FCS, the IRC can better understand the impact of its programs and tailor its services to meet the specific needs of its clients (IRC 2017; IRC 2023).

**One-on-one sessions.** As a part of its personalized financial coaching program, the IRC conducts one-on-one sessions with humanitarian migrants, offering tailored financial guidance. These sessions address debt management, goal setting, and financial planning while reviewing the client's financial health metrics, including their budget and credit score, through confidential discussions. One-on-one sessions also center on credit-building strategies, as clients often express heightened interest in this topic (IRC 2017; IRC 2023).

**Hybrid (classroom + one-on-one sessions).** The hybrid approach integrates classroom instruction with individualized coaching. Clients first attend group sessions to develop foundational financial knowledge, covering key financial topics that are necessary for understanding the U.S. financial system. These sessions are followed by one-on-one consultations with coaches who provide tailored guidance based on the client's individual needs. This integrated approach is crucial for clients seeking to utilize CEO loans, as it ensures engagement in educational sessions and targeted coaching, both of which are critical to the loan application process. For example, clients who are interested in applying for an Auto Loan would first learn about vehicle purchasing and maintenance in an Auto-Purchase Education group session. Then, the client receives personal guidance on how to apply for the loan. In a private consultation, the coach meets with the client to review their budget, assess creditworthiness, gather application documents, and discuss the client's ability to repay the loan (IRC 2017; IRC 2023).

**CEO loan access.** A vital complement to IRC financial capability services is provided through the Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO), a certified Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI) lender. As a CDFI, the CEO specializes in the development of flexible and affordable consumer and microenterprise loans for humanitarian migrants who have limited access to traditional financial services. CEO loans are developed in tandem with programs and services operated by community partners, such as the IRC. The loans are integrated into capacity-building programs including workforce development, microenterprise support, financial capability programming, and immigration services, which are crucial for empowering borrowers and fostering financial stability. Among these, credit-building loans play a critical role for IRC clients, serving as a means to establish credit safely. Credit building loans are structured like a ladder; clients initially borrow a small value with a 0% interest loan, repay it, and then gain access to slightly larger loans. This process helps clients acquire and build a credit history, eventually granting access to other sources of credit. Overall, CEO loans empower individuals to address immediate financial needs and pursue long-term goals by providing access to small-dollar loans at affordable rates (IRC 2017; IRC 2023).

In summary, IRC's financial capability programming equips humanitarian migrants with the knowledge and skills needed to navigate the intricacies of a new financial environment. However, to better understand why these services are essential, it is important to discuss the financial challenges humanitarian migrants face upon arriving in the U.S.

## Financial Challenges for Newly Arrived Humanitarian Migrants

One of the biggest challenges that humanitarian migrants face upon arriving in their host country is navigating the new financial landscape. Given the urgency, unpreparedness, and traumatic nature of forced migration, humanitarian migrants tend to experience a high degree of financial hardship during their resettlement process. These financial hardships come in the form of an economic strain encompassing factors such as employment, income, number of dependents, and access to resources (Bogic, Njoku, and Priebe 2015; Halpern 2008; O'Donnell, Stuart, and O'Donnell 2020). Resettled humanitarian migrants face a disproportionate risk of experiencing financial hardships because (1) they arrive in the U.S. with few financial resources, and (2) they encounter numerous barriers when attempting to access such financial resources (O'Donnell, Stuart, and O'Donnell 2020).

### **Access to financial resources**

The nature of forced migration typically does not allow humanitarian migrants to plan for departure. As such, humanitarian migrants may leave behind sources of income (such as businesses, properties, and savings) and their possessions, including evidence of professional qualifications, without which they may be unable to continue their professional careers in the resettlement country (Hynie 2018). Upon arrival in the U.S., the humanitarian migrants' financial disadvantage is compounded by a lack of knowledge of navigating the formal and complex financial system in a new environment as well as inadequate support to provide a foundation for developing economic self-sufficiency and social integration. Furthermore, humanitarian migrants from countries where formal financial institutions are corrupt, distressed, or perceived as open only to elites commonly distrust such institutions and tend to avoid interactions with banks and lenders (Kim et al. 2022; Northwood and Rhine 2018). Newly arrived humanitarian migrants often lack credit history which not only limits access to housing, phones, and other essential aspects of everyday life, but also leaves them disproportionately vulnerable to predatory loan practices (Lin 2022). Due to a combination of these reasons, humanitarian migrants are less likely to access financial services such as deposit accounts, payments, credit, insurance, and other mainstream services, without which it is challenging to build economic independence and self-reliance (UNHCR 2023).

### **Barriers to financial resources**

Even when humanitarian migrants are willing to interact with financial institutions and attempt to gain access to financial resources, other barriers stand in the way, such as lack of familiarity with the financial system, language, cultural differences, socioeconomic status, and education levels.

***Lack of familiarity with the U.S. financial system.*** It is expected that humanitarian migrants coming from countries that have similar financial systems and bank participation rates to the U.S. will find it easier to financially integrate into the banking system than humanitarian migrants from countries that have dissimilar financial structures and bank participation rates. Under the latter circumstances, some humanitarian migrants may be more cautious about the U.S. financial markets due to bad experiences with or lack of knowledge about these markets. Typically, humanitarian migrants with this background will be somewhat slower to integrate into the U.S. financial system (Northwood and Rhine 2018). Other aspects of financial integration — such as using credit cards and other payment methods, contributing to savings and retirement programs, becoming a homeowner, and making investments in stocks or bonds — may also be unfamiliar practices for certain humanitarian migrant populations and influence their financial integration in the U.S. (Northwood and Rhine 2018).

***Language.*** A complicating factor for humanitarian migrants' road to receiving financial resources is language. Language plays a role in two different ways. First, some humanitarian migrants have limited English-speaking skills and are unable to effectively communicate with bank representatives and understand financial statements (Lin 2022). If institutions do not accommodate the humanitarian migrants' needs — by providing translation or interpretation services — it becomes nearly impossible for humanitarian migrants to utilize mainstream financial services effectively (Zhang 2023). Second, some humanitarian migrants arrive in the U.S. with a relatively low “home country” literacy level, meaning they have a limited ability to read or write in their native language. Under these circumstances, even if humanitarian migrants can receive financial information in their native language, they will still be profoundly challenged in comprehending account applications, contracts, or other legal documents' implications (Northwood and Rhine 2018).

***Cultural differences.*** Cultural differences may also affect financial integration because different populations have different norms, attitudes, and experiences related to managing money. For example, some cultures view the practice of borrowing money and carrying debt negatively, which may deter humanitarian

migrants from taking loans to purchase homes or cars and build credit histories (Cackley 2010). Apart from these cultural differences, it is important to emphasize that barriers humanitarian migrants face may also differ due to specific needs based on factors such as age, gender, family structure, and religion (Cackley 2010; Northwood and Rhine 2018; O'Donnell, Stuart, and O'Donnell 2020).

**Digital literacy.** Digital literacy — skills needed to use digital technology, communication tools, and networks to acquire and evaluate information, communications, and perform practical tasks — also affects the financial integration of humanitarian migrants due to the digitalization of financial services (Potocky 2021). While studies show that humanitarian migrants frequently use technology for social aspects, a growing literature emphasizes that humanitarian migrants find it difficult to use technology for tasks such as online banking, applying for public benefits, and completing job applications. Thus, low digital literacy levels can serve as a barrier for humanitarian migrants who do not feel confident in using technology for such purposes (Potocky 2021).

### **Services needed to financially integrate humanitarian migrants into their host country**

Given the barriers that humanitarian migrants face upon resettlement, there is a need for organizations to step in and assist with their financial integration to ensure a smooth transition into the host country's financial system. The IRC is an example of such an organization. Through its financial capability programs, the IRC has established services designed to foster both financial literacy and financial inclusion and to support the development of full financial capability in humanitarian migrant households. To establish its programs, the IRC has used what is known as the “financial coaching” method, which prioritizes each client's unique financial goals and assists them in achieving them.

## **Financial Coaching and the IRC**

### **Financial coaching**

Financial coaching is a continuously growing field that utilizes a client-driven process to help individuals achieve their financial goals. While research into financial coaching has gradually progressed, results from studies conducted over the past fifteen years have shown promising evidence of the effectiveness of coaching programs in fostering behavioral change. In 2010, the Citigroup Foundation and NeighborWorks America partnered to expand financial capability programs for low- and moderate-income clients, establishing the Financial Capability Demonstration Project. The project focused on scaling infrastructure for the expansion of coaching programs through course development and training of practitioners for thirty financial coaching programs. Financial outcomes were tracked over a two-year period using assessments before and after the program. The project yielded favorable results, with 54% of clients who began the project with no savings finishing their financial coaching services, with a median increase in savings of \$668. The positive impact also extended to clients who already had savings upon entering the project, as 48% of people finished with a median increase of \$938 in savings. Additionally, clients who engaged in coaching sessions over a longer period experienced greater improvements in their credit scores. At the end of the project, clients saw their credit score increase by an average of 59 points (NeighborWorks America 2013).

A 2015 randomized controlled trial conducted in New York and Miami confirmed the correlational relationships of previous studies and established a causal link between financial coaching and outcomes. Findings showed statistically significant improvements in savings, with treatment group participants in New York achieving an average balance of \$1,721 greater than the control group after one year. Other key metrics demonstrated the effectiveness of coaching, with credit scores showing statistically significant improvements at both sites. Clients within the treatment group at the New York location increased their average credit score

by 33 points relative to the control group, raising their score to just above 600. Total debt declined by \$10,650 for the treatment group in Miami, equating to a 20% reduction in debt compared to the control group (Theodos, Stacy, and Daniels 2018).

Research examining the effects of financial coaching on credit offers further support that effective financial coaching leads to positive outcomes. Modestino et al. conducted a randomized controlled trial through the Boston Youth Building Credit Initiative to measure the effect of financial coaching services on young adults. The study tracked changes in credit access and credit scores over an eighteen-month period. Findings indicated that within six months of starting the program, individuals within the treatment group showed a 10% greater likelihood of having access to credit. By the end of the study, the treatment group had increased their credit score by an average of 26 points. Furthermore, financial coaching had positive impacts in other areas of financial well-being, including lowering interest rates on car loans and reducing their reliance on alternative financial services such as payday loans, auto title loans, and informal borrowing (Modestino, Sederberg, and Tuller 2019).

Beyond financial metrics, clients engaging in coaching services exhibit a significant improvement in financial behaviors and attitudes. The FCS survey, developed by the University of Wisconsin–Madison Center for Financial Security, serves as a tool for assessing overall client financial behavior and confidence. From 2015 to 2019, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau implemented the Financial Coaching Initiative, which examined the financial behaviors of 23,005 clients using the FCS survey. Results indicated that financial capability increases with the number of coaching sessions attended; specifically, 36% of clients showed improvements in budgeting skills by beginning to use a personal budget, and 18% succeeded in establishing an emergency fund (CFPB 2021). Using an alternative capability survey, the Immigrant Integration Financial Capability Project evaluated the effect of integrating financial coaching into immigration services, identifying a 32% increase in client-reported confidence in budgeting and managing money. By the end of the program, the percentage of clients who actively used a budget rose to 50%, representing a 35% increase from baseline results. Furthermore, there was a significant increase in the rate of monthly savings for clients, from 37% to 62%, highlighting their ability to utilize the practical knowledge learned in the program (Pisanont et al. 2015). The results of these studies demonstrate the potential for financial capability programming to foster improved management skills and elicit behavioral change, improving financial well-being.

### **Financial coaching model**

Collins and O’Rourke define the financial coaching methodology as a “collaborative solution-focused, result-orientated, systematic, and strengths-based process in which the coach facilitates the enhancement of personal financial management practices.” This definition is rooted in the broader principles of life coaching, which emphasizes the importance of identifying behavioral outcomes, capitalizing on individual strengths, and monitoring progress. The financial coaching approach focuses on the development of practical solutions through which clients are held accountable for making measurable progress toward their financial goals. As facilitators, coaches utilize a systematic process of active listening and informed questioning, helping the client foster personal financial growth. Throughout the partnership, the coach utilizes a strengths-based philosophy, as clients learn to identify their skills and are then assisted by the coach in applying them to an action plan (Collins and O’Rourke 2012).

One of the most crucial aspects of financial coaching is its distinction from other financial services such as counseling and education. Financial counseling primarily focuses on solving financial problems for clients in an unstable situation by offering immediate prescriptive solutions. Financial counseling services often occur for a short time on an ad-hoc basis with minimal monitoring of future progress. Financial education, however, focuses more on increasing the clients’ financial literacy level on a set topic through instructional



sessions that provide targeted information (Wagner 2019; Collins 2014). Clients are taught in a didactic and prescriptive manner, with the expectation that the knowledge they learn will be applied independently (Collins 2014). Research on financial capability shows that general knowledge and skills are not enough to create financial well-being. Instead, consumers need support in translating knowledge and skills into action. Knowing where to seek reliable information and how to make financial decisions are key components of financial literacy (CFPB 2015).

Financial coaching differs from both services because it is a long-term partnership designed to promote self-sufficiency through the facilitation of skills and behavior modification. Coaches work collaboratively with clients to create self-directed goals and solutions. The benefit of the financial coaching model is that clients are in charge: the clients determine which changes in financial behaviors best suit their interests and create and refine their goals in a process tailored to their individual needs. Coaches continually provide support to clients by tracking goals and monitoring progress to ensure accountability (Collins and O’Rourke 2012).

**Table 2: Distinction Between Financial Coaching, Counseling, & Education**

	<b>Financial Coaching</b>	<b>Financial Counseling</b>	<b>Financial Education</b>
<b>Length of Service</b>	Weeks to months	Single session or as needed	1-2 scheduled sessions
<b>Client Status</b>	Stable	In crisis	Moderately stable
<b>Monitoring/Accountability</b>	Continuous follow-up with accountability check-ins	Minimal; done on ad-hoc basis	Client expected to apply knowledge independently
<b>Objective</b>	Client-led	Counselor-led	Educator-led on client-selected topic
<b>Outcomes</b>	Behavioral change & skill development	Problem-solving	Targeted financial knowledge

Note: This table depicts the distinctions between financial coaching, counseling, and education, as found in the literature review. The IRC uses a hybrid model, integrating key elements from all three methods to provide services tailored to the needs of humanitarian migrants.

### **IRC’s financial coaching framework**

The financial capability services of the IRC differ from the models described as it employs a blended service framework approach, integrating financial coaching, literacy, and education into one system. The program’s financial coaching component is delivered through personalized one-on-one sessions, where coaches meet with clients to establish financial goals and implement a plan of action. Coaches remain flexible to the needs of humanitarian migrants, as they occasionally act in a financial counseling capacity to deal with crises due to the barriers humanitarian migrants face in understanding the U.S. financial system. In addition, the program employs classroom sessions to facilitate financial literacy and education through interactive learning. Classroom sessions provide clients with financial knowledge by delivering structured lessons on budgeting, saving, banking, credit management, and tax preparation in a group setting. To incorporate the benefits of financial coaching, literacy, and education into one program, the IRC uses a hybrid model that merges one-on-one meetings and classroom sessions. This integrated approach ensures that clients receive the necessary financial knowledge and are given support to apply the knowledge effectively through financial coaching, helping to enact positive behavioral change (IRC 2023).

The IRC excels further in improving financial outcomes for humanitarian migrants by facilitating access to flexible and affordable loan products through the IRC's Center for Economic Opportunity, a non-profit CDFI. While CEO loan service extends beyond the conventional scope of the standard financial coaching framework, it plays a pivotal role in strengthening humanitarian migrants' integration into the U.S. financial system by providing increased access to financial products tailored to their needs. Through offering small-dollar consumer and business loans at affordable rates, the IRC's CEO aims to reduce the barriers faced by humanitarian migrants, promoting greater inclusion and upward mobility (IRC 2023).

The comprehensive services framework implemented by the IRC is designed to improve the economic success of humanitarian migrants. By integrating critical elements of financial and non-financial services, the IRC's financial capability programming offers a holistic suite of in-house services, facilitating the financial integration of its clients. However, the program's success is limited due to the program's funding structure.

The IRC funding for financial capability programming has a variety of sources. Primarily, the funding in most IRC offices comes from private sources. For instance, companies like Wells Fargo commit a sum to IRC's programming, hoping to better IRC clients' lives by supporting them in developing a strong financial foundation, building assets, and achieving economic mobility in their new communities. Another funding source for the financial capability programming comes from federal pass-through funding, which occurs when a federal agency (in particular an ORR integration program) awards funds to state governments, which then distribute the funds discretionally. For instance, the ORR pass-through funding administrator in New Jersey is the New Jersey Office of Refugees, which determined that some pass-through funding can be used to support financial capability programming. Lastly, another source of funding comes from municipalities or states. For instance, the IRC offices in Dallas, Sacramento, and Denver receive funding for financial capability programming directly from their states or municipalities (IRC 2023).

Because of this funding structure, there is no guarantee on the amount of funding year by year, and the IRC's financial capability programming is dependent on other entities' willingness to provide funding sources — something that is not sustainable for a project of this scale. Furthermore, the funding sources are not specifically designated to serve humanitarian migrant populations. Even though the ORR pass-through integration funds are designated for some humanitarian migrants, the organization does not include specific funding for financial capability programming. To address these shortcomings, consistent federal funding as a part of ORR integration funding would allow the IRC to better implement its financial capability programming. On a higher level, the consistent ORR integration funding in this area would emphasize and give validity to the importance of financial capability programming as an important piece of humanitarian migrants' integration in the U.S. The data analysis of IRC's financial capability programming below offers support that such programming effectively improves the humanitarian migrants' financial integration.

# Data Analysis

This report draws on data collected by the IRC as a part of its program implementation processes. These data include:

- Credit bureau pulls from TransUnion. Credit checks happen at the beginning of coaching and are recorded in IRC’s database when clients apply for a CEO loan or are served with one-on-one sessions or hybrid programming.
- Income based on reported family budget information, which includes employment income, other income sources, and expenses. Budgets are created during the client’s intake for those enrolling in one-on-one or hybrid sessions and are used for CEO loan applications. Coaches are advised to collect follow-up data six months after recording the baseline, according to best practice. Additionally, budgets are recorded and tracked when clients take out a loan.
- The Financial Capability Scale developed at the University of Wisconsin, which is a six-question scale on financial behaviors and confidence. Clients are asked to answer the questions at their initial intake and again at follow-up. Follow-up is collected approximately six months after the baseline is recorded.

## The FICO Bankcard Score 8

TransUnion uses FICO Score 8. The FICO Bankcard Score 8 is used for credit card issuers to help understand the likelihood that a borrower will be 90 or more days late on a credit card payment in the next 24 months (FICO Score 8 and Why There Are Multiple Versions of FICO Scores). FICO 8, a credit scoring model commonly used by various lenders including the CEO from IRC, evaluates creditworthiness but overlooks rent payment history in its computation. Timely rent payments are not factored into the FICO Score 8 assessment.

The dataset focuses on clients who have arrived from October 2022 to early February 2024, evaluating the early financial lives of recent arrivals. The dataset used for analysis represents a subset of clients utilizing financial capability services from the IRC during the earliest periods of financial integration. Data regarding the usage of IRC programs will likely vary over time. While baseline data is consistently recorded, not all clients in the dataset have follow-up assessments. Within the dataset, there are 6,168 clients. Of the 6,168 clients, approximately 3,033 clients have provided initial baseline data and varying available data in follow-up assessments. This subset does not represent the entire spectrum of client engagement at IRC. The discrepancy in available data occurs because some clients in the dataset may not yet be due for their six-month follow-ups. Additionally, not all baseline or follow-up measures may be recorded depending on the program type. IRC records credit scores and family budgets for clients enrolled in one-on-one sessions, FCS for clients enrolled in the classroom education program type, and all three (credit scores, family budget, and FCS) if clients are enrolled in the hybrid program type. While IRC clients have the option to apply for CEO loan products, it may not be suitable for all clients. The majority of clients who access CEO loans opt for small-dollar credit-building ladder loans designed to assist them in establishing a credit history.

This analysis of IRC’s program will utilize both descriptive and inferential statistical techniques. Descriptive statistics will summarize the characteristics of clients that the IRC supports, while inferential statistics, such as correlations and regression analysis, will explore the associations between financial programming and financial outcomes for IRC clients. While the data analysis looks at these relationships, it does not establish causation due to the limitations of observational data analysis. The analysis provides insights into associations and outcome differences among different client types that utilize financial programming from the IRC.

## Research Questions

Four questions guide our analysis:

- (1) What characteristics differentiate clients who persist in coaching from those who discontinue participation?
- (2) How does the number of sessions attended in the program correlate to savings, credit scores, and family budget data?
- (3) How does loan usage in the program correlate to savings, credit scores, and family budget data?
- (4) Do clients in financial capability programs experience an increase in financial literacy scores?

The first question aims to identify the characteristics of clients who utilize IRC programming compared to other demographic groups through descriptive statistics. The second question assesses whether a significant correlation exists between attending financial capability programming and liquid assets, net worth, credit scores, and family budgeting improvements. Similarly, the third question examines how loan utilization may impact liquid assets, net worth, credit scores, and family budgeting improvements. The last question examines the FCS to measure the program's effectiveness in enhancing clients' understanding of financial concepts and systems.

## Descriptive Statistics

Our analysis commences with an in-depth examination of Table 3, which presents a demographic distribution by persistence in program attendance. This table classifies clients across varied categories, including English proficiency, the highest level of education, initial monthly income, gender, immigration status, and nationality, furnishing a substantive foundation for the subsequent statistical justifications and engagement pattern observations. The analysis utilizes a threshold of three attended sessions (i.e., classroom, one-on-one, and hybrid) to define clients' persistence. This threshold is statistically justified: it effectively bifurcates our client pool into two distinct groups, enabling us to discern more subtle engagement patterns. This demarcation provides a transparent and data-driven rationale for separating clients into more and less persistent cohorts for further analysis.

**English proficiency.** The distribution of English proficiency levels among clients who attended three or more sessions shows a broad spectrum of language skills. Notably, 25.5% of these persistent attendees need to improve their English proficiency, and 24.9% have some English skills, suggesting that more-than-sufficient English does not deter clients from engaging continuously in the program. Furthermore, clients with excellent and good English proficiency make up 9.7% and 19.1% of the persistent group, respectively. Yet for those attending two or fewer sessions, a higher proportion struggles with English proficiency: 27.3% have none, and 23.0% have some. The percentage of clients with unknown English proficiency levels is substantial in both groups — 20.8% for the more persistent and 20.3% for the less persistent — pointing to possible critical areas for program support enhancement. This data underscores the importance of considering English proficiency when crafting program support strategies. It also forms a solid basis for incorporating financial capability services into federal humanitarian migrant integration funding, emphasizing the need for such services to be culturally and linguistically attuned to address this population's distinct requirements effectively.

**The highest level of education.** Among clients who attended more than three sessions, a diverse educational background is evident, with the majority having completed secondary school at 31.9%. Primary education is 23.1%, and those without formal education represent 15.5% of clients. There is also a noticeable portion of clients with higher education: 20.5% attended university, and 3.0% hold an advanced degree. Conversely, the educational distribution for clients attending two or fewer sessions tends toward lower

educational levels, with 20.2% having no formal education and 31.3% having completed secondary school. In this less persistent group, the proportion attending university (15.8%) or holding an advanced degree (2.4%) is somewhat less. These figures highlight that while individuals with secondary education are most prevalent among those persisting in the program, there is a significant drop in participation among those with the least and the most education. This discrepancy could signal potential obstacles or a mismatch between the program's offerings and the specific needs or interests of individuals with different educational levels.

**Initial monthly income.** Analysis of initial monthly income shows the clients' starting family budget based on total monthly employment income. The data reveals that a considerable portion of the clients who attended more than three sessions, at 31.7%, earn less than \$1,000 per month, suggesting significant participation from those in the lowest income bracket. Clients with monthly incomes between \$2,000 and \$2,999 represent 28.8% who persistently engaged, indicating that higher income levels do not necessarily correlate with reduced participation. In the group attending two or fewer sessions, those earning less than \$1,000 per month make up the largest segment at 38.8%, with those in the \$2,000 to \$2,999 range accounting for 24.2%. This suggests that although financial challenges may affect program participation, they only partially hinder engagement. The representation of clients from various income levels in both persistence categories indicates that additional factors influence sustained involvement in the program.

**Gender distribution.** Males are slightly more likely to persist with program attendance, with 57.9% of those attending more than three sessions being male, compared to 42.1% being female. This trend continues among those with lower attendance, where 62.2% are male and 37.8% are female in the group that attended three or fewer sessions. These figures suggest gender-specific factors influencing program engagement. The higher persistence rate among males could indicate that the program offerings align more with male client needs or schedules, or there might be cultural beliefs connecting gender and finances in host countries. Conversely, the proportionally lower persistence rate among females may reflect additional barriers to sustained attendance, such as caregiving responsibilities or other socio-economic factors.

**Immigration status (at arrival).** Among the clients who attended more than three sessions, refugees represent the largest segment, with 667 individuals accounting for 48.8% of this group. This indicates that refugees tend to be the most persistent attendees. Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders are also present, making up 14.1%, and parolees follow with a substantial 30.0%. Clients with other immigration statuses make up 7.8% of the persistent attendees. In contrast, among those attending two or fewer sessions, refugees comprise the most significant proportion at 52.3%, showing a relatively consistent engagement across different levels of persistence. SIV holders are at 12.6%, parolees at 25.0%, and other statuses at 10.0%. These percentages suggest that while refugees maintain steady participation, there may be distinct challenges or needs affecting the attendance of SIV holders and parolees that could be addressed with more tailored support or program adaptations to increase persistence.

**Top 10 nationalities.** The data presents the leading nationalities among the program's clients. Afghan clients are the most represented among those who persist in attending more than three sessions, accounting for 43.6% of this group. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Syria also have considerable persistence rates, at 11.4% and 8.8%, respectively, followed by Ukraine at 9.8%. Other significant representations include nationals from Guatemala and Burma. For those attending two or fewer sessions, Afghan clients also lead at 38.7%, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Syria remaining prominent at 13.9% and 8.1%, respectively. Notably, the 'Others' category comprises 12.2% of the persistent group and 17.0% of the less persistent group, reflecting a broad spectrum of nationalities participating in the program. This category encompasses countries not individually listed, each with fewer than 350 participants, including but not limited to nations like Cameroon, Congo, Pakistan, Ghana, etc. This breakdown provides valuable insight into which

nationalities are most actively engaging with the program and may help tailor support for those with lower attendance persistence.

This multifaceted analysis underscores the intricate interplay between clients' demographic characteristics and their engagement in the program. It highlights the need for a nuanced, personalized approach in program design that accounts for the clients' varied educational backgrounds, genders, immigration statuses, and nationalities to optimize support and enhance program efficacy.

**Table 3: Demographic Distribution by Persistence in Program Attendance**

Demographic Categories	3 or more Sessions		2 or fewer Sessions	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
<i>English Proficiency</i>				
Excellent	157	9.7	279	9.8
Good	309	19.1	558	19.6
Some	401	24.9	656	23
None	411	25.5	779	27.3
Unknown	336	20.8	577	20.3
Total	1,614	100	2,849	100
<i>Highest Level of Education</i>				
None	165	15.5	529	20.2
Primary School	246	23.1	719	27.4
Secondary School	340	31.9	820	31.3
Technical School	64	6	74	2.8
Attended University	218	20.5	414	15.8
Advanced Degree	32	3	64	2.4
Total	1,065	100	2,620	100
<i>Initial Monthly Income</i>				
< \$1,000	446	31.7	641	38.8
\$1,000 - \$1,999	212	15.1	217	13.1
\$2,000 - \$2,999	404	28.8	399	24.2
\$3,000 - \$4,000	173	12.3	186	11.3
> \$4,000	170	12.1	208	12.6
Total	1,405	100	1,651	100
<i>Gender Distribution</i>				
Male	1,199	60	2,427	58.2
Female	798	40	1,743	41.8
Total	1,405	100	4,170	100
<i>Immigration Status</i>				
Refugee	667	48.8	1,296	52.3
Special Immigrant Visa	192	14.1	312	12.6
Parolee	410	30	619	25
Others	98	7.8	249	10
Total	1,367	100	2,476	100
<i>Top 10 Nationalities</i>				
Afghanistan	866	43.6	1,609	38.7
Dem. Re. Congo	226	11.4	580	13.9
Syria	174	8.8	338	8.1
Ukraine	195	9.8	319	7.7
Guatemala	54	2.7	118	2.8
Burma	33	1.7	182	4.4
Colombia	45	2.3	54	1.3
Salvador	46	2.3	89	2.1
Iran	47	2.4	97	2.3
Venezuela	57	2.9	70	1.7
Others	243	12.2	706	17
Total	1,968	100	4,162	100

Source: IRC Financial Capability Report Data.

Note: The varying total sample sizes in the demographic categories are due to the structure of the dataset, which consists of 6,168 clients. Among these, 3,033 clients have complete initial baseline data.

## Findings

Literature suggests that financial coaching and education may have a positive relationship on humanitarian migrants establishing credit and creating good credit habits, increasing their financial literacy, and increasing humanitarian migrants' savings balance. To determine if humanitarian migrants' use of IRC programming and products has a positive relationship with these financial outcomes, this report uses client-reported liquid assets<sup>3</sup> and net worth, TransUnion credit scores, and financial capability scores gathered by the IRC.

Two caveats must be considered while reading this report's results. First, the analysis conducted in this report is done with the knowledge that the programs are client-led; as such, clients may have different financial priorities in their early periods of economic integration. For instance, clients in the early integration stages often focus on paying for necessities, finding stable work and housing, and sending remittances back to family members in other countries rather than maintaining a good credit score or building up savings account balances (Hansen 2016). Second, the issue of selection bias also plays a role — the analysis of each outcome contains between 400 and 800 data points from the 6,168-client population. The clients with outcome data may differ substantially from those who attend sessions and do not have complete outcome data or those who do not use IRC products or continue to attend IRC sessions.

### Session Attendance and Financial Outcomes

Session attendance varies widely across IRC clients. Clients attend a median of 2 sessions, but individual attendance ranges between 1 and 33 sessions. The median total time spent in IRC sessions is 1 hour, with 34 days between a client's initial meeting with IRC and their final recorded session.

Table 4 shows the average financial capability score, the average reported liquid assets, and the average credit score of the clients who attended two or fewer sessions and the clients who attended three or more sessions. Differences between the averages are negligible. Differences between credit scores and financial capability scores are less than 1%, and differences between liquid assets are less than 5%.

**Table 4: Average Outcome Results by Session Attendance**

Number of Sessions Client Attended	Change in Liquid Assets	Latest Credit Score <sup>4</sup>	Latest FCS Score	Change in FCS Score
2 or fewer	1355.5	688.5	6.5	0.99
3 or more	1392.9	682.1	6.5	0.90
Total	1381.8	684	6.5	0.92

Source: IRC Financial Capability Report Data.

Note: Total Sample size = 572; 2 or fewer = 136; 3 or more = 436.

To confirm this, we estimated OLS regressions to gauge the strength and significance of any relationship between the number of sessions attended and the identified financial outcomes. None of the identified outcomes had a significant relationship with increased attendance. We also looked at net worth to account for non-liquid assets and declines in debt. When considering clients' attendance of sessions of any type, there is no relationship between greater attendance and greater net worth; however, when controlling for session type, clients who attended classroom sessions had a significantly higher net worth increase. Classroom

<sup>3</sup> Liquid assets combine self-reported data on clients' savings account balance, checking account balance, and cash on hand from clients' household budgets.

<sup>4</sup> The average change between initial and final FICO scores is 19 points; however, only 61 of the 460 clients with an initial score have a second score included in the data.



attendees report a \$3,233 higher net worth increase than those who did not attend classroom sessions.<sup>5</sup> Though data does not suggest a relationship between greater attendance and an increase in assets, when controlling for the English level and age of the client, session type appears to have a positive relationship with credit score increases. Clients who attend classroom sessions tend to have a credit score of 27 points higher than clients who attend one-on-one sessions alone. Similarly, clients who attend hybrid sessions tend to have a score of 16 points higher than clients who attend one-on-one sessions alone.

Attendance for three or more sessions of any type does have a significant relationship with the likelihood of clients gaining a score. While the relationship is significant, it may only be indicating that coaches are more likely to perform a second credit check on clients who attend more sessions rather than indicating whether these clients are more likely to have a credit score than those who attend fewer sessions. Approximately 4,000 clients have no data available for the earliest FICO score check. To ensure missing data did not influence the results, we controlled for initial FICO reason codes<sup>6</sup>, indicating that a coach conducted a credit check, but clients had insufficient financial history to receive a credit score. 80% of clients who had no score due to insufficient history during their initial check and who have a secondary credit check through IRC have since gained a credit score.

## Loan Usage and Financial Outcomes

Approximately 15% of IRC clients accessed CEO loan products, the vast majority of which are small credit-building loans meant to help clients build a credit history. Table 5 lists the averages of outcome variables for those who use IRC loans, showing that clients who have used CEO loans have higher liquid assets on average than clients who do not use loan products. Average financial capability scores are also slightly higher for these clients. Data does not indicate a strong relationship between accessing these loans and having a higher FICO score.

**Table 5: Average Financial Outcomes and Loan Usage**

	Change in Liquid Assets	Latest Credit Score	Change in Net Worth	Change in FCS Score
Have not used CEO loans	746.3	685.8	2908.5	0.9
Have accessed loan	1903	683.2	3967.7	0.9
Total	3832.4	684.0	3544.4	0.9

Source: IRC Financial Capability Report Data.

Note: Total Sample size = 747; No CEO loan = 407; Loan = 340.

Regression analysis shows that the relationship between increased liquid assets and loan access is significantly different from zero at the .01 level. Though there is wide variation in loan values, the majority of loans are credit-building loans with a median value of \$100. The average client receives only \$300 total in loans from IRC, indicating that the increase in liquid assets is, on average, greater than the clients' loan amounts. There is no significant relationship between net worth and loan access. The variation between the financial capability scores of clients who have not accessed loans and those who have accessed loans is not significant. Similar to attendance results, loan access has a significant positive relationship with clients gaining a credit

<sup>5</sup> For full regression table with controls, see Appendix A.

<sup>6</sup> Official codes provided by Transunion; by only including clients who have a code that indicates insufficient history we can ensure that no clients without an initial credit check were considered.

score.<sup>7</sup> 372 clients who did not have an initial credit score due to lack of credit history had a credit score during a follow-up credit check. Of these 372 clients, 70% were clients who accessed CEO loans.

## Outcomes and Demographics

Though demographics vary greatly across clients with outcome data, the differences between clients do not have a strong relationship with data. Gender, education, English proficiency, nationality, and household size showed no significant relationship between these demographics and changes in liquid assets or changes in net worth.<sup>8</sup> Clients with household income greater than \$3,000 reported lower increases in liquid assets, and clients with monthly income higher than \$4,000 a month reported significantly lower increases in net worth. Clients from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Venezuela and clients with household incomes of less than \$2000 a month are significantly less likely to obtain a credit score. Clients from Syria, on average, had a 1.1-point lower increase in FCS scores than other clients. Clients from Salvador and Venezuela had significantly higher increases in FCS scores than other clients.

## Outcomes and Variation Across Cities

IRC has twenty-six offices that offer financial capability programming across seventeen states. Client load varies heavily between offices, with the most frequented offices providing financial capability programming for more than three hundred clients and the smallest offices serving less than fifty clients over the past two years. Variation among offices extends to client retention as well as client outcomes. In eighteen of the twenty-six offices, more than 60% of clients attend only one or two sessions. Differences in uptake may be due to office variation or variation in client quantity and demographics, which could affect demand for larger classroom sessions. Clients from different cities access loans at similar rates. City locations have been removed from the data to reduce the amount of identifying information in the data; we use stand-in labels in the discussion below.

When controlling for initial income, liquid asset outcomes vary significantly across all offices. Figure two shows the regression results for the average change in liquid assets for clients from different cities.<sup>9</sup> Nearly half of all cities had significant variation in liquid asset outcomes. After adding additional controls, the change in liquid assets is only significant in City C, D, and F, while clients in City B have significantly higher net worth than clients in other cities. The proportion of clients with an available credit score also varies between cities. It is difficult to know whether a greater proportion of these clients have a credit score or if certain offices are more likely to pull a second credit score. Though there is less variation among clients' latest credit scores and increases in financial capability scores, certain offices show significantly different outcomes from others. Clients in City P and City C, on average, have a one-point greater increase in FCS scores.<sup>10</sup> This report cannot speak to the causes for variation as characteristics of the locations may differ. For instance, factors such as available resources or average wage may have an underlying effect on economic outcomes for humanitarian migrants in the area that is captured in this relationship.

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
<sup>7</sup> For full regression table with controls, see Appendix B.

<sup>8</sup> For full regression table, see Appendix D.

<sup>9</sup> Results are significant if the standard deviation line does not cross the y-axis; some cities are missing from the table due to insufficient data.

<sup>10</sup> For full regression table with controls, see Appendix C.

Figure 2: Change in Liquid Assets by City<sup>11</sup>



Source: IRC Financial Capability Report Data.  
 Note: Sample size = 639; estimates provided in Appendix C.

## Recommendations

### Recommendation for Public Policy

#### **The ORR should designate specific integration funds for Financial Capability Programming**

Achieving economic self-sufficiency<sup>12</sup> for humanitarian migrants is a key objective of the resettlement program under the Immigration and Nationality Act.<sup>13</sup> The ORR currently only mandates resettlement support services focused on employment, cash, and medical assistance but offers additional services via pass-through funding, requiring state plan justification. However, upon submission to and approval by the Director of ORR, any additional service can be funded if it supports the primary objectives of the resettlement program.<sup>14</sup> As achieving economic self-sufficiency requires an understanding of the U.S. financial system, we recommend that the ORR designate funds to include financial capability programming as part of its resettlement support services.

The ORR allocates funding for resettlement support services through formula and discretionary grants. Formula grants are awarded automatically based on a predetermined formula that accounts for the number of ORR-Eligible populations that arrived and served over the past three years. This consistent form of funding ensures that states can provide necessary resettlement support services using a standardized process. Discretionary grants, in contrast, are awarded through a competitive process for specific projects that address

<sup>11</sup> Some cities are missing from the analysis due to small sample size.

<sup>12</sup> “Economic self-sufficiency,” defined in Public Welfare, 45 CFR §400.2 (Definitions, Subpart A) (2020), accessed April 1, 2024, [https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/part-400/section-400.2#p-400.2\(Economic%20self-sufficiency\)](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/part-400/section-400.2#p-400.2(Economic%20self-sufficiency)).

<sup>13</sup> Purpose of the Program, in Public Welfare, 45 CFR §400.1(b) (2020), accessed April 1, 2024, [https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/part-400#p-400.1\(b\)](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/part-400#p-400.1(b)).

<sup>14</sup> Refugee Social Services, in Public Welfare, 45 CFR §400.155(h) (2020), accessed April 1, 2024, [https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/part-400/subpart-1#p-400.155\(h\)](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-45/part-400/subpart-1#p-400.155(h)).

targeted issues (Bruno 2011). The current framework restricts ORR funding to select resettlement support services during the initial resettlement period, neglecting to provide funds specifically designated for financial capability programming. The lack of funding highlights a gap in the ORR's ability to fulfill the purpose of the resettlement program. Given the interdependent relationship between economic self-sufficiency, employment, and financial stability, securing employment and income alone does not guarantee stability for humanitarian migrants who cannot navigate the complex U.S. financial system.

The report shows that financial capability programming equips humanitarian migrants with the knowledge, skills, and resources needed to achieve greater economic stability and long-term financial success. To ensure successful integration, the ORR must prioritize funding for financial capability programming through formula grants, incorporating them into the resettlement support services provided for newly resettled humanitarian migrants.

***Empowerment through financial literacy.*** Financial literacy is a foundational skill that empowers individuals to make informed financial decisions. By providing humanitarian migrants with access to financial capability programming, they will be equipped with the knowledge and skills needed to manage their money effectively, budget for expenses, understand financial products and services, and build savings for the future.

***Promoting economic empowerment.*** Financial capability programming plays a critical role in promoting economic empowerment among humanitarian migrants. By helping humanitarian migrants secure employment, access banking services, and make sound financial decisions, these programs contribute to their ability to support themselves and their families over the long term, reducing their reliance on public assistance programs.

***Mitigating financial vulnerability.*** Humanitarian migrants are often vulnerable to financial exploitation and fraud due to their lack of familiarity with the U.S. financial system. Financial capability programming can help mitigate this risk by educating humanitarian migrants about common scams, predatory lending practices, and their rights and responsibilities as consumers. By arming humanitarian migrants with this knowledge, we can help protect them from financial exploitation and promote their financial well-being.

***Facilitating long-term integration.*** Financial stability is a key component of successful integration into society. By investing in financial capability programming for humanitarian migrants, we can facilitate their long-term integration into their new communities by enabling them to access affordable housing, transportation, education, and other essential services. This fosters a sense of belonging and empowerment among humanitarian migrants, contributing to humanitarian migrants' well-being and resilience.

Incorporating financial capability programming into ORR integration funding through formula grants is not only a sound investment in the future success of humanitarian migrants but also a reflection of the ORR's commitment to fostering their empowerment, resilience, and integration into American society. By equipping humanitarian migrants with the knowledge, skills, and resources to navigate the financial landscape of their new homeland, the ORR can empower them to build brighter futures for themselves and their families, enriching the fabric of our communities and nation.

## Recommendation for the IRC

### **Improve data collection**

The IRC should continue to collect data by investing in data collection procedures. The IRC uses several methods to gather data, and coaches work with clients to record credit scores from TransUnion upon client approval and to record income through reported family budget information and the FCS. Although baseline data is consistently recorded, not all clients have follow-up assessments due to challenges in conducting them.

As a result, there is considerable incomplete data. In assessing program effectiveness, investing in data collection should be considered.

***Train IRC staff to improve data collection.*** To address the existing gaps in data quality, the IRC should prioritize training staff involved in data collection to equip them with best practices, emphasizing the importance of accuracy, consistency, and completeness. In 2015, the Center for Financial Security conducted a census of financial coaches that revealed that coaches have a high desire for increased training in data collection practices (Lienhardt 2019). By investing in data collection procedures and providing staff with the necessary training and support, the IRC can improve the quality and completeness of its data, which will enhance the organization's ability to assess program effectiveness, identify areas for improvement, and better serve its clients.

***Quality assurance protocols.*** Implement protocols for ongoing quality checks to ensure data accuracy and reliability. The IRC can accomplish this by establishing clear objectives aligned with outcomes, assigning a staff member to handle the data entry process, and ensuring ongoing checks for accuracy (Cohen et al., n.d.). By implementing protocols and using quality assurance methods for data accuracy, the IRC can enhance the reliability of collected data and ensure its suitability for program evaluation and decision-making.

***Identify and gather priority data.*** While collecting data on all measures may present a time burden for clients and the capacity of staff to collect and analyze data, the IRC should discuss priority data to decrease time and resource constraints. By focusing efforts on collecting key data points such as savings, employment income, and expenses, the IRC can streamline the data collection process while still obtaining valuable insights for program assessment and improvement.

***Improve retention.*** Data is collected throughout the course of clients' participation in the IRC's financial capability programming and used to track client progress. Much of the missing data arises from the challenge of follow-up and follow-up data. Given the median time clients spend engaged with IRC financial programming is approximately two months, most clients do not reach the six-month timeframe when coaches generally begin working with clients to complete an updated budget sheet or a secondary FCS. The IRC should identify causes of early disengagement to assist coaches in increasing client retention and program usage. By increasing client attendance, coaches will be able to gather more robust data for clients, enabling them to gain a better understanding of the needs of clients who do not persist while also providing a greater perspective on the financial outcomes of a larger proportion of humanitarian migrants who use IRC financial capability programming.

## Conclusion

In evaluating the efficacy of the International Rescue Committee's financial capability services for newly arrived humanitarian migrants, this report identifies the program's crucial role in facilitating economic empowerment and integration into the U.S. financial system. By providing comprehensive services in financial coaching, literacy, education, and access to tailored financial products, the services provided by IRC show improved financial well-being and stability for humanitarian migrants.

Financial capability programs play a vital role in equipping humanitarian migrants with the necessary skills and knowledge to navigate the U.S. financial system and manage their money effectively. This report's background research and in-depth analysis confirm that these programs are instrumental in helping humanitarian migrants achieve financial stability. This stability empowers humanitarian migrants to actively contribute to the economy, support their families, and build secure and prosperous lives within their communities. The data analysis conducted on the IRC's financial capability programming shows that despite challenges associated with language, technology adaptation, difficulty navigating the U.S. financial system, and

cultural differences, clients who engage in the program show notable improvements in their ability to overcome barriers and achieve financial security. Financial capability programming has been successful in promoting economic stability, as evidenced by its positive influence on credit scores, savings behavior, and budget management. At the same time, this report highlights the difficulties faced by the IRC in data collection. A major challenge in this project has been incomplete data, with only 6 to 13% of the sample being viable for regression analysis. Incomplete datasets due to varying levels of client engagement and difficulties in conducting follow-up assessments present substantial barriers. Consequently, these issues hindered our ability to provide an extensive evaluation of the program's effectiveness.

Due to these challenges, we recommend the IRC continue to refine its data collection and tracking practices to better understand the needs of its clients. The IRC currently uses several data collection methods, with coaches working with clients to document key financial metrics. Although the baseline data is consistently recorded, not all clients have follow-up assessments where staff can record progress, leading to gaps in data quality. By improving the overall data accuracy and quality, the IRC can tailor its services more effectively to client needs. Improved data management practices will support the IRC's efforts to secure federal funding, allowing them to continue their ongoing mission to restore health, safety, education, economic well-being, and power to people devastated by conflict and disaster.

Overall, this report has shown that financial integration is a crucial aspect of the humanitarian migrant resettlement period in the U.S. Given the critical impact of financial capability services in the financial integration of humanitarian migrants, we recommend the ORR allocate specific funds for financial capability programming through formula grants, establishing it as a part of their resettlement support services. Targeted funding would facilitate the expansion of financial capability services, directly improving economic stability and security for humanitarian migrants — a primary goal of the U.S. resettlement program as stated under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

# Appendices

## Appendix A: Regression Results: Attendance and Outcomes

	Change in Liquid Assets	Change in Net Worth	Change in FCS	Credit Score Acquisition	Expense to Income ratio	Latest FICO Score
Number of Sessions (rel: <3)						
3 or more	126.91 -451.31	959.23 -751.66	0.106 (0.261)	0.129*** -0.03	-0.06 -0.12	-6.520 (7.088)
Immigration Status (rel: refugee)						
Special Immigrant Visa	251.21 -744.38	939.78 -1766.64	-0.387 (0.463)	0.00 -0.04	-0.13 -0.19	-2.453 (12.673)
Parolee	607.50 -816.74	1255.11 -1417.27	0.069 (0.381)	0.114** -0.04	-0.10 -0.15	6.087 (10.272)
Others	-1232.82 -722.10	922.15 -1572.61	-0.140 (0.483)	0.07 -0.05	-0.18 -0.14	2.899 (10.627)
Session Type (rel: 1:1)						
Classroom	942.57 -1238.13	4379.42 -3338.13	-0.431 (0.377)	0.06 -0.06	-0.06 -0.12	44.852** (15.054)
Hybrid	-6.73 -415.37	843.60 -725.20	0.339 (0.230)	0.05 -0.03	-0.19 -0.11	13.831* (5.984)
Nationality (rel: Afghanstan)						
Dem. Re. Congo	-442.99 -1075.96	-4132.70 -2337.75	0.380 (0.644)	-0.091* -0.04	-0.476* -0.23	-69.929** (24.960)
Syria	541.94 -1262.80	959.19 -1941.95	-0.293 (0.519)	0.07 -0.07	-0.30 -0.25	-32.702 (19.839)
Ukraine	1176.19 -1097.95	648.36 -1452.48	0.554 (0.411)	-0.08 -0.05	-0.314* -0.13	28.708*** (8.392)
Guatemala	-385.11 -686.52	447.77 -1572.83	1.071 (0.551)	0.12 -0.09	-0.397* -0.19	-12.071 (14.993)
Burma	288.97 -1174.70	-3319.86 -2210.53	0.313 (0.592)	-0.04 -0.09	-0.664** -0.22	-14.280 (30.046)
Colombia	133.75 -881.20	-2382.12 -1402.11	1.026 (0.838)	0.03 -0.08	-0.39 -0.24	-27.848 (16.007)
Salvador	174.12 -952.70	-967.98 -1800.80	1.404* (0.563)	-0.09 -0.06	-0.730** -0.25	-0.396 (14.890)
Iran	753.07 -1317.54	-777.61 -2376.20	1.048 (0.717)	0.00 -0.07	-0.563*** -0.14	8.678 (15.764)
Venezuela	1291.03 -829.47	-2066.75 -1740.38	2.916*** (0.739)	-0.161*** -0.05	-0.887*** -0.18	-27.950* (12.539)
Other	-80.36 -668.13	304.24 -1607.57	-0.441 (0.413)	-0.08 -0.04	-0.26 -0.15	-8.165 (11.389)
Household Size (rel: 1)						
Household Size=2	744.15 -879.17	264.89 -1261.91	0.682 (0.385)	0.07 -0.04	0.04 -0.09	15.035 (8.805)
Household Size=3	101.10 -613.75	-120.94 -1020.18	0.104 (0.274)	0.067* -0.03	0.312*** -0.09	6.679 (7.666)
Household Size=4	-355.52 -650.28	1720.57 -1359.87	-0.196 (0.289)	0.03 -0.03	0.628*** -0.17	30.750*** (8.367)
Monthly Household Income (rel: <1000)						
1000-1999	-532.95 -626.72	-2,049.712* -982.66	-0.438 (0.352)	-0.01 -0.04	0.12 -0.15	-18.621* (9.366)
2000 - 2999	-497.56	465.54	-0.420	0.03	-0.406**	1.861

	-595.66	-1010.41	(0.250)	-0.03	-0.14	(7.469)
3000 - 4000	-1061.26	373.43	-0.386	-0.02	-0.397*	15.438
	-774.42	-1839.59	(0.344)	-0.04	-0.16	(9.944)
Greater than 4000	-1056.16	-2342.75	-1.185***	0.03	-0.411**	-2.498
	-956.41	-1380.22	(0.342)	-0.04	-0.14	(9.336)
English Level (rel: excellent)						
Good	-958.85	-827.99	-0.334	-0.118*	0.00	-4.135
	-654.17	-1554.26	(0.348)	-0.05	-0.09	(7.830)
None	-305.95	-1505.98	-0.224	-0.232***	0.27	-7.234
	-797.63	-1361.93	(0.405)	-0.05	-0.15	(12.048)
Some	-597.54	-1458.79	-0.313	-0.140**	0.26	-2.643
	-624.49	-1197.84	(0.371)	-0.05	-0.17	(7.750)
Unknown	450.95	-1251.18	-0.447	-0.10	0.06	-1.888
	-914.08	-1441.51	(0.365)	-0.06	-0.10	(8.726)
Gender (rel: male)						
Female	-250.91	828.55	0.019	-0.01	0.03	-2.814
	-407.75	-996.27	(0.199)	-0.03	-0.09	(6.233)
Observations	424	435	313	1028	371	236

Source: IRC Financial Capability Report Data.

Note: OLS regression estimates. Statistical significance level relative to zero:

\*\*\* = .01 level; \*\* = 0.5 level; \* = .10 level.



## Appendix B: Regression Results: Loan Usage and Outcomes

	Change in Liquid Assets	Change in Net Worth	Change in FCS	Credit Score Acquisition	Expense to Income Ratio	Latest FICO Score
Have accessed loan	1,018.036*	1,294.12	0.154	0.188***	-0.159	-8.778
	-462.478	-809.006	-0.207	-0.026	-0.092	-7.062
Immigration Status (rel: X)						
Special Immigrant Visa	242.952	844.811	-0.268	-0.023	-0.109	-5.227
	-730.947	-1,748.87	-0.459	-0.039	-0.193	-13.126
Parolee	722.39	1,471.61	0.073	0.112**	-0.081	6.445
	-789.791	-1,323.39	-0.382	-0.038	-0.151	-11.084
Others	-1,184.51	567.441	-0.135	0.054	-0.133	2.316
	-725.802	-1,536.90	-0.456	-0.049	-0.141	-10.44
Nationality (rel: X)						
Dem. Re. Congo	-240.675	-3,007.79	0.333	-0.05	-0.398	-57.603
	-941.674	-1,656.12	-0.722	-0.04	-0.217	-31.067
Syria	567.607	1,126.56	-0.146	0.108	-0.324	-31.813
	-1,275.70	-1,869.04	-0.518	-0.067	-0.254	-19.473
Ukraine	801.986	201.138	0.526	-0.087	-0.307*	25.384**
	-1,047.32	-1,465.91	-0.408	-0.049	-0.127	-8.652
Guatemala	-279.775	304.943	1.114*	0.113	-0.369*	-25.726
	-691.82	-1,534.23	-0.55	-0.094	-0.183	-15.539
Burma	-452.385	-4,756.985*	-0.15	-0.039	-0.617**	-22.185
	-1,073.94	-2,289.48	-0.497	-0.082	-0.215	-24.372
Colombia	-7.639	-2,121.96	1.206	0.065	-0.387	-34.084*
	-880.076	-1,381.74	-0.828	-0.069	-0.256	-15.963
Salvador	166.085	-1,005.80	1.317*	-0.055	-0.631**	-16.813
	-912.638	-1,620.38	-0.562	-0.06	-0.234	-14.188
Iran	435.344	-815.612	0.99	-0.069	-0.505***	4.12
	-1,260.31	-2,379.44	-0.742	-0.069	-0.146	-17.638
Venezuela	1,080.71	-2,074.39	3.055***	-0.122**	-0.888***	-28.122*
	-864.945	-1,773.44	-0.728	-0.046	-0.184	-13.447
Other	-254.489	159.526	-0.347	-0.064	-0.248	-8.779
	-666.926	-1,513.85	-0.413	-0.043	-0.144	-12.156
Household Size (rel: 1)						
Household Size=2	508.594	-122.294	0.729	0.075	0.067	16.122
	-884.637	-1,273.75	-0.389	-0.042	-0.086	-9.641
Household Size=3	-41.48	-278.694	0.174	0.061	0.299***	11.279
	-589.413	-1,006.97	-0.267	-0.032	-0.085	-7.929
Household Size=4	-358.435	1,720.60	-0.153	0.04	0.606***	33.434***
	-643.912	-1,323.76	-0.28	-0.034	-0.158	-8.818
Monthly Household Income (rel: <1000)						
1000-1999	-541.384	-1,876.760*	-0.48	0	0.128	-13.183
	-623.443	-943.288	-0.344	-0.038	-0.153	-10.201
2000 - 2999	-546.598	550.3	-0.393	0.019	-0.400**	2.42
	-591.382	-990.097	-0.255	-0.03	-0.142	-7.627
3000 - 4000	-1,118.61	480.109	-0.366	-0.034	-0.391*	13.664
	-765.122	-1,964.43	-0.354	-0.044	-0.158	-10.017
Greater than 4000	-1,187.93	-2,275.00	-1.163***	0.034	-0.397**	-0.774
	-976.671	-1,402.99	-0.337	-0.043	-0.138	-9.312
English Level (rel:excellent)						
Good	-906.661	-914.553	-0.331	-0.092*	-0.015	-6.375
	-649.379	-1,452.15	-0.345	-0.046	-0.088	-7.782
None	-92.499	-1,277.03	-0.096	-0.167***	0.189	-8.927

	-787.121	-1,377.51	-0.401	-0.045	-0.139	-12.127
Some	-533.186	-1,547.18	-0.268	-0.100*	0.26	-4.362
	-613.179	-1,161.77	-0.369	-0.046	-0.163	-7.878
Unknown	637.62	-969.414	-0.455	-0.054	0.028	-1.176
	-929.213	-1,432.64	-0.37	-0.057	-0.101	-9.145
Gender (rel: male)						
Female	-72.551	1,038.44	-0.008	-0.003	0.029	-1.197
	-422.998	-1,046.83	-0.207	-0.025	-0.088	-6.349
Observations	426	437	314	1,031	373	237

Source: IRC Financial Capability Report Data.

Note: OLS regression estimates. Statistical significance level relative to zero:

\*\*\* = .01 level; \*\* = 0.5 level; \* = .10 level.

## Appendix C: Regression Results: Cities and Outcomes

	Change in Liquid Assets	Change in Net Worth	Change in FCS	Credit Score Acquisition
Office (rel: A)				
City B	1,337.36	7,914.55***		0.21***
	-1,454.34	-2,382.35		-0.04
City C	3,844.70*	2,977.91	0.75*	0.29***
	-1,759.94	-2,533.31	-0.35	-0.05
City D	4,488.78**	5,179.89*	-0.44	0.29***
	-1,721.88	-2,583.26	-0.35	-0.05
City E	2,776.70	4,558.43	-0.62	0.24*
	-1,571.91	-2,396.04	-1.01	-0.1
City G	2,915.17	6,059.14	0.03	0.10*
	-1,673.32	-3,943.96	-0.33	-0.05
City F	2,635.71	-7,270.42		0.08
	-1,546.10	-4,964.30		-0.05
City H	2,379.23	1,463.40		0.11**
	-1,844.06	-2,999.79		-0.03
City I	2,336.81	506.66	0.29	0.1
	-2,108.60	-2,835.04	-0.57	-0.06
City J	1,520.27	1,558.40		0.21***
	-1,610.44	-3,106.30		-0.05
City K				-0.09
				-0.05
City L	2,988.09	1,402.35	-0.27	0.27***
	-1,588.43	-2,185.38	-0.4	-0.05
City M	2,217.05	506.89	-0.51	0.22***
	-1,358.21	-2,194.82	-0.61	-0.06
City N	3,320.38*	4,050.75	-0.45	0.20***
	-1,563.55	-2,776.93	-0.27	-0.04
City O	4,068.48	5,813.59	-0.3	0.16***
	-2,316.92	-3,027.59	-0.34	-0.04
City P	2,863.59	-6,402.39	1.28**	0.07
	-1,536.98	-7,506.62	-0.44	-0.05
City Q	4,607.97*	12,500.60	-0.46	0.07
	-2,175.67	-6,643.18	-0.65	-0.1
City R	1,988.88	2,515.39	-0.46	0.23***
	-1,452.16	-2,805.86	-0.24	-0.06
City S	1,393.31	-477.86	-0.44	0.13*
	-1,556.64	-2,470.03	-0.48	-0.05
City T	2,205.91	-673.97	0.31	0.01
	-2,277.88	-3,487.62	-0.29	-0.05
City U	634.58	-151.84	0.51	0.02
	-1,654.06	-2,467.24	-0.32	-0.03
City V	7,064.39	3,098.82	0.29	0.29***
	-3,890.76	-5,248.34	-0.47	-0.05
City W	2,584.57	1,486.00	1.2	0.07
	-1,493.18	-2,746.14	-0.64	-0.06
City Y	2,340.64	554.97	-0.59	0.21**
	-1,515.56	-3,133.54	-0.51	-0.07
City Z				-0.03
				-0.05
Nationality (rel: A)				
Dem. Re.Congo	-716.64	-3,638.43	0.37	-0.11***

	-1,086.85	-2,148.55	-0.59	-0.03
Syria	730.42	412.82	-1.01**	0.05
	-783.01	-1,242.63	-0.39	-0.04
Ukraine	1,595.37	2,983.10	0.52	-0.09**
	-950.1	-2,353.94	-0.31	-0.03
Guatemala	511.25	-988.27	0.86*	-0.02
	-509.7	-1,706.43	-0.43	-0.05
Burma	-881.77	-5,084.46**	-0.4	-0.06
	-844.81	-1,866.66	-0.32	-0.04
Colombia	12.83	-1,592.83	1.15	-0.04
	-819.24	-1,525.95	-0.82	-0.06
Salvador	144.45	598.45	1.41*	-0.07
	-1,080.78	-1,727.52	-0.63	-0.06
Iran	1,422.85	7,600.60	1.27*	0.01
	-889.64	-8,430.60	-0.52	-0.04
Venezuela	1,258.97	-3,732.19*	2.94***	-0.12*
	-703.68	-1,718.85	-0.63	-0.05
Other	2,246.30	104.59	-0.1	-0.06*
	-1,645.43	-2,293.18	-0.25	-0.03
English Level (rel: Excellent)				
Good	174.94	238.65	-0.35	-0.04
	-691.19	-1,622.80	-0.27	-0.03
None	18.18	465.63	0.12	-0.15***
	-640.76	-1,564.13	-0.33	-0.03
Some	-612.29	-1,190.70	-0.18	-0.07*
	-551.02	-1,220.51	-0.29	-0.03
Unknown	995.9	-846.45	-0.02	-0.02
	-792.07	-1,548.32	-0.26	-0.04
Monthly Household Income				
1000-1999	-566.45	-455.86	-0.53*	0.04
	-690.61	-1,317.29	-0.26	-0.03
2000 - 2999	-989.14*	-1,164.16	-0.53*	0.03
	-501.02	-884.65	-0.22	-0.02
3000 - 4000	-1,489.16**	-1,726.16	-0.72**	0.07*
	-544.71	-2,229.95	-0.27	-0.03
Greater than 4000	-2,060.95*	-5,341.31***	-1.29***	0.06
	-838.77	-1,478.07	-0.28	-0.03
Mean	1,281.02	3,046.50	0.92	0.17
Observations	639	656	499	2,532

Source: IRC Financial Capability Report Data.

Note: OLS regression estimates. Statistical significance level relative to zero:

\*\*\* = .01 level; \*\* = 0.5 level; \* = .10 level.

## Appendix D: Regression Results: Demographics and Outcomes

	Change in Liquid Assets	Change in Net Worth	Change in FCS	Credit Score Acquisition
Household Size (rel: 1)				
Household Size=2	-383.972	-2,325.87	0.494	0.055
	-806.638	-1,817.98	-0.327	-0.031
Household Size=3	-434.63	-2,362.18	0.096	0.029
	-611.673	-1,381.05	-0.24	-0.024
Household Size=4	-828.23	-121.169	-0.006	0.007
	-649.632	-1,470.85	-0.247	-0.025
Gender (rel: Female)				
Male	482.865	59.343	0.034	0.026
	-471.332	-1,066.36	-0.186	-0.019
Nationality (rel: )				
Dem. Re.Congo	-486.473	-2,971.75	0.677	-0.119**
	-1,216.73	-2,787.40	-0.509	-0.04
Syria	60.88	-261.084	-0.845**	0.033
	-892.79	-2,026.36	-0.323	-0.04
Ukraine	1,436.36	2,898.51	0.49	-0.042
	-771.558	-1,761.47	-0.328	-0.031
Guatemala	-575.313	-43.36	0.82	-0.008
	-1,154.23	-2,585.73	-0.49	-0.054
Burma	300.31	-2,914.96		-0.115
	-4,977.08	-11,439.01		-0.074
Colombia	-275.542	-2,797.51	1.221	-0.001
	-1,462.04	-3,027.92	-0.706	-0.063
Salvador	-16.826	-960.581	1.499**	-0.077
	-1,320.62	-2,940.20	-0.48	-0.06
Iran	739.712	4,837.33	0.998	-0.042
	-1,223.10	-2,807.99	-0.562	-0.046
Venezuela	459.221	-2,529.30	3.148***	-0.130*
	-1,437.57	-3,300.41	-0.673	-0.062
Other	815.317	-673.982	-0.039	-0.066*
	-838.4	-1,888.86	-0.307	-0.027
Age				
26-40	808.805	2,279.41	0.068	0.038
	-595.725	-1,349.39	-0.243	-0.024
41-55	885.006	1,709.70	0.122	0.033
	-778.992	-1,762.78	-0.312	-0.03
55+	1,510.92	2,673.21	0.059	0.02
	-1,686.14	-3,437.80	-0.556	-0.057
Monthly income (rel: <1000)				
1000-1999	106.68	-90.549	-0.349	0.028
	-658.515	-1,497.99	-0.279	-0.028
2000 - 2999	-917.692	-507.429	-0.396	0.053*
	-552.89	-1,252.35	-0.224	-0.023
3000 - 4000	-1,259.78	-353.186	-0.487	0.069*
	-715.623	-1,634.51	-0.275	-0.03
Greater than 4000	-1,461.85	-2,096.94	-1.247***	0.067*
	-767.343	-1,740.50	-0.283	-0.028
Observations	548	562	420	2,267

Source: IRC Financial Capability Report Data.

Note: OLS regression estimates. Statistical significance level relative to zero:

\*\*\* = .01 level; \*\* = 0.5 level; \* = .10 level.

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